THE New Republic

How 1958 Looked to Herblock, Mauldin

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The Communes in Communist China

By STANLEY RICH

Middle East Irreconcilables

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JANUARY 5, 1959

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Washington Wire

Storm Warnings

CONGRESS meets next week. Every sign points to explosive political transition. The battle won't wait—it starts the first day. To see the immensity of the stakes, let's go back a bit.

In 1954 the voters gave Eisenhower a Democratic Congress; in 1956 (for the first time in a Presidential election in 108 years) they picked an Executive of one party and a Congress of another; in 1958 they gave the same President a hostile Congress three times running. These are storm warnings if ever there were any!

Look at the *dramatis personae*. On the decimated GOP side, history has rarely shown such a group of stumblebums as make up the "regular" Congressional leadership—Bridges and Dirksen in the Senate and Joe Martin in the House. They haven't an idea in their heads. The Aiken liberal group (ironically, the erstwhile "Eisenhower Republicans" now disinherited by the White House) have rebelled in mere self-defense. They see disaster if a new Republican image doesn't appear before 1960. The agile Nixon waits for his own moment to break with Eisenhower and lets friends here know in the meantime that he sympathizes with Aiken as against the White House. But as author of the disastrous "scare" campaign against the Democrats last November, Nixon's reputation will be hard to salvage. Nelson Rockefeller watches from the wings.

On the Democratic side there is subtle Lyndon Johnson—"master of the immediate"—who knows every trick of the road but has no road map. He has a shadow cabinet of conservatives in the party's Steering and Policy Committees and Southerners in the regular committee chairmanships. The party is split on the moral issue of civil rights. America's new liberal tide may break against this combination in vain.

On foreign affairs it is symptomatic of 1959 that the chairman of the Senate committee is 91. Behind the chairman is Sen. William Fulbright (D, Ark), brilliant but ineffective, who could supply leadership but is content with merely scolding Secretary Dulles in the Senate cloakroom.

Now turn to the Executive: Two tired men — Dulles, almost 70; Eisenhower, fretful of the public, more and more walled off (with only two press conferences since the election and only 21 in all 1958) and obsessed with the budget. The compassionate public does not attack President Eisenhower; they have simply found out that he is empty. It is just about like a Hollywood stage set; you open a door and there is nothing there.

And yet the demand for activist government is arising, there can be no doubt of it. It is like 1929 again, with the country waiting for an FDR. At home the recession still lingers; abroad we face a six months' ultimatum over Berlin from Khrushchev, and the Communists are openly and publicly using the dreadful word "war."

America's creaking government has been stalled in emergency before; some blame the Civil War on the torpid Buchanan. Certainly such stalemates killed ratification of the League of Nations, and deepened the 1929 depression until every bank had closed. The traditional way for our government to respond is to wait two years, then hold another election and get a fresh start with fresh leaders. But will the jet atomic age permit two years' grace any longer?

The Moscow ultimatum expires shortly and First Deputy Premier Mikoyan pays us a visit almost at once. If this new Congress does not act who will?

The answer is hardly Eisenhower. On the budget, for example, he proposed last week to cut expenditures $3 billion (to $77 billion for fiscal year 1960) although population has increased three million. The more people, the less spent! At that rate by 1985 the nation will have 256 million people and no federal budget at all. (Of course the White House announcement was a political trick and the budget a phony, designed to put the burden for the unhappy Eisenhower's prospective fourth deficit on the Democrats.)

The striking thing in this extraordinary situation is that the New Men in Washington, the Moderns, actually have the votes in the legislature to meet the crisis if it were a matter of simple majority on a parliamentary government. It is the institutional handicaps which entangle them like flypaper at every move. Eisenhower, with his Executive veto and 50 Southern conservatives in the House and 10 in the Senate, has the power to prevent many bills from becoming law. Minority control of the House Rules Committee and minority manipulation of the filibuster in the Senate can, unless remedied, suffocate the people's will expressed in the smashing election. Foreign policy still remains largely in control of the White House. And it can also set aside additional defense funds voted by an anxious Congress.

The Undisciplined Parties

ONE must face the fact, finally, that the evolution of disciplined political parties is rudimentary in America, though the emergence of the Democratic Advisory Council begins to give hopeful continuity, and the Republicans themselves are now proposing another between-elections conference like the famous Mackinac Island gathering in Michigan that swung the party from isolationism to internationalism.

Well—maybe this is too long a disquisition on the background of the new Congress! But you won't understand what happens unless you see the whole picture: the awful problems, the need of action, the will of the Moderns to act, and the institutional flypaper that makes action so difficult. In past times this would have spelled stalemate.

But we simply cannot afford stalemate today: something must give or America's world authority will continue to decline. That is what makes the Moderns' twin massed assault on Senate filibuster and House Rules Committee next week so important. They are struggling for positive government, for implementation of an election victory, for majority rule. The battle comes the minute Congress meets.

Now you have the program. It's a tremendous drama: the curtain is rising.

T.R.B.

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A Communication

► ***Filibuster and Fair Debate***

SIRS:

WALTER LIPPMANN'S opposition, in his syndicated column last week, to a change in the Senate rules to enable a majority of those elected to shut off a filibuster and come to a vote after full debate, is especially regrettable in view

(Continued on page 23)

Tax, Ax or Relax?

IN 1959, Eric Sevareid asks, will the Administration prove "too old, too tired to cope with anything but the house-keeping tasks of government?" From the President's unusual statement of December 22, in which, more than three weeks before presentation of his Budget Message, he announced that the budget for fiscal year 1960 would be in balance at a level of $77 billion, we conclude that the answer to Sevareid's question has been given. The Administration, faithful to its accountant mentality, is counting our pennies without counting the cost of under-estimating the nation's needs and capacities. To believe in Mr. Eisenhower's preliminary estimates, you have to be, as Senator Cooper (R, Ky.) dolefully said, "pretty optimistic."

The brevity of the President's statement leaves much to be disclosed but two paragraphs give his impression of the sources of the proposed $77 billion which the federal government hopes to take in, and its allocation:

> The budget will provide higher expenditures than ever before in time of peace for national defense. Some of our domestic non-defense programs will also continue at record high levels. Other domestic programs will be held at varying levels consistent with the public interest.
>
> Reductions in total spending will be achieved in part by reason of the ending of temporary programs in agriculture, unemployment insurance and housing.

In addition to savings from these reductions, Mr. Eisenhower also will ask for increased gas taxes and increased payments by users of government services, including an added penny for the post office. He has said that no general tax boosts are contemplated.

How do the President's anticipations square with recent experience? Actual budget expenditures for fiscal year 1958, the year that ended last June, were $71.9 billion, and the government wound up the year with a $2.8 billion deficit. Estimated expenditures for the current fiscal year, as presented in the Presidential Budget Message last January, were $73.9 billion, and a surplus of $500 million was forecast. But by midyear, the estimate of expenditures had risen to $79.2 billion, and because of both rising expenditures and an intake diminished from $74.4 to $67 billion, a deficit of $12 billion is now in view. This is the largest deficit since the $20 billion war-end deficit of 1946.

What are the changes on which the President is relying to raise the federal income to $77 billion next year? In the absence of all but fringe tax changes, the two primary sources—the individual income and the corporate income tax, with an assist from excises, are expected to do the job.

Since the government gets approximately half of all corporate profits, the profit rate and the tax take move along together. In the first half of 1958, recession-hit corporate profits ran at an annual rate slightly below $32 billion; they had recovered to an annual rate of $45 billion by the last quarter and are projected at a level of nearly $53 billion by the last quarter

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of 1959, with the year averaging out at $48-50 billion. This would very considerably improve the Treasury's income position.

Personal income held a much steadier course during the recession, but the annual rate in November, $360 billion, was $13.6 billion higher than the February low, and each time that there is a personal income gain of $1 billion, the Treasury gets around $150 million. In general, the size of the economy as of the fourth quarter of 1959 may be anything from $468 billion to $505 billion; and these figures compare to an annual total of about $439 billion for the year 1958.

If the President's requests for both one-cent more on inter-city first-class letters and various parcel post increases are approved by the Congress, they might bring in around $418 million; his proposed tax increases on gasoline for cars, conventional planes and jets would produce more than a quarter of a billion more, part of which he wishes to channel to general revenues, away from their current destination in the Highway Trust Fund.

In all this, it should be kept in mind that the wreckage caused by the recession in last year's revenue estimates proves the iffyness of budgetary estimates. Still the receipts side of the proposed budget looks far more reliable than the expenditures column.

Three major sorts of spending ran up the $5.3 billion extra bill that appeared between January and the budgetary mid-year review last August. Bumper crops and fair weather carried estimated outlays under various agricultural programs up by $1.9 billion—and some $100-200 million more may be added by the end of the fiscal year. Recession-induced payments for unemployment compensation and public assistance accounted for nearly 600 additional millions. New authorizations for government purchase of mortgages to spur the construction industry took Housing and Home Finance outlays up over a billion.

At the same time, Congress passed pay raises for federal civilian employees in excess of those budgeted and with retroactive features; and by accepting only part of the Administration's recommendations for postal rate increases, it enlarged the post office deficit.

Mr. Eisenhower now anticipates lower outlays for agriculture, partly because of the expiration of the soil-bank program. But crops will be grown on these no-longer-reserved acres, and be eligible for payments under the support programs. Winter wheat plantings, at 45 million acres, are up by one million acres over last year. Federally-owned surpluses may reach a record of around $6.8 billion; and $1 million-a-day now paid by taxpayers for storage may go up to as much as $1.7 million.

Similarly questionable is the President's anticipation of an end to temporary unemployment programs. For the recent climb in the Federal Reserve Board's industrial production index has been unaccompanied by a corresponding reduction in employment: the seasonally-adjusted annual employment rate moved only from 7.6 percent of the work force in August to 5.9 percent in mid-November. Some employment lag is the usual feature of recovery, but this lag appears prolonged.

On foreign aid, Mr. Eisenhower has yet to make known his recommendations. But it can be confidently predicted that, for all his brave words about responding to the new Soviet economic offensive, the President has caved in to the accountants. Instead of $1 billion in new monies for the Development Loan Fund, a sum which Under-Secretaries of State Herter and Dillon have repeatedly said is the minimum needed each year henceforth, Mr. Eisenhower is expected to ask for $700 million; he will ask for this, moreover, as just another annual appropriation, though Herter and Dillon have said often enough that the Loan Fund should be put on a permanent financial footing comparable to the World Bank's, through a long-range "lump sum" appropriation. The President has already backed away from his own best convictions in this area and in a cowardly manner will leave it up to Congress to do what is required in the national interest. The very purpose of the Loan Fund is thwarted by the year-to-year appropriations hassle; uncertainty in Washington leads first to uncertainty and then to desperation on the part of the economic planners in aid-receiving countries.

How will the Congress react to Mr. Eisenhower's relaxed estimate of what the country can afford? On the revenue side, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills suggested some time back that a general review of the tax structure is in order; he foresees a $3-5 billion deficit even if the budget were held to the Administration's $77 billion level.

On the expenditure side, Sen. Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania is probably not far removed from the thinking of many of his colleagues when he proposes a budget of $82-83 billion, calculated to offset "the obsolescence of the public sector of the economy"—schools, highways, hospitals, airports—with $5-6 billion raised to balance this enlarged budget through tax changes repealing the dividend credit, tightening up on depletion and depreciation allowances and capital gains.

We share these views. It will be up to the Congress to affirm that under-use of existing economic capacity and under-expansion of the facilities needed by a growing population are high-cost items, whether the budget one has in mind is the social budget, the national security budget, or the dollars-and-cents budget of future years.

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They Don't Believe It

IT IS STILL thought by many that on one subject General Eisenhower's word can be taken without question: military security. By assuring the nation that "the budget [for 1960] will provide higher expenditures than ever before in time of peace for national defense," the President seems to promise that national security will be safeguarded as never before. But does it really mean much more than that the price of military hardware is higher than ever? And has Mr. Eisenhower sufficiently considered the danger that our present military policy may amount to surrender-in-advance because of its over-reliance on the deterrent effects of nuclear retaliation and its consequent inability to meet more limited, conventional threats? Before we accept assurances from the White House at face value, it is well to consider the less optimistic opinions of Pentagon officers and scientists charged with evaluating weapons systems and US military requirements.

We are told by the well-informed military analyst of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch,* Thomas R. Phillips (Brig. Gen. USA, Ret.), that these authorities "are talking, not of massive retaliation and deterrent strategy, but of the 'minimum deterrent'." They use this term to describe the present situation with regard to US overseas bases, and General Phillips reports,

> prospectively . . . with regard to air bases in the US, when a potential enemy will with only a thousand or so medium and long-range rockets be able to wipe out 75 percent or more of our retaliatory force in a surprise attack. Today the doctrine of both the US and the Soviet Union is that the other's means of delivery of atomic and hydrogen bombs and warheads are the first targets of their missiles and bombs. But as a result of the "missile gap" in the US weaponry, our own retaliatory bombing forces can be substantially wiped out in a surprise attack.

"What will be left to the West then," General Phillips quotes the military planners as believing,

> will be only enough of a retaliatory force to have a threat of destruction to a number of Soviet cities—30, 40, 50? *There will not be enough of a retaliatory force left to justify an attempt to destroy the enemy's offensive forces.* [Italics ours.] The "minimum deterrent" is therefore a situation where we cannot win a war if it occurs and can only hope to prevent one by the threat of mass annihilation of the enemy's population.
>
> But is the minimum deterrent a deterrent at all? The other side will still have intact much of its long-range nuclear capacity. It can threaten to destroy 10 American cities, and will be able to do so, for each of its cities destroyed. His "second strike" force will be immeasurably superior to ours.

But how is this possible? The natural reaction of the citizen to these terrifying realities, General Phillips acknowledges,

> knowing the billions spent by the United States annually on defense, knowing the high technical competence of United States industry, is one of skepticism. Indeed, this is the reaction of many of the civilian officials, particularly with a business background, in the Administration and the Defense Department. They do not believe fully confirmed intelligence reports of Soviet military accomplishments. Unconsciously, they cannot believe that the United States can be lagging in relation to the dictator-driven Communists.
>
> In consequence, they deny in published statement and addresses the facts that our intelligence quite clearly tells them.

The chief of the guided missiles program, William M. Holaday, in an address last April, admitted another reason for suppressing the facts: The conflict between the duty to keep the public informed of the dangers we face and the need to keep the confidence of the free world in US strength.

But the fact remains, General Phillips concludes, that if the calculations of NATO and Pentagon experts are correct,

> the missile gap is already here and the United States has been forced into a "minimum deterrent" threat for a period in which we have no chance of winning a major war.

Venezuelan Oil Squeeze

VENEZUELA'S unexpected announcement that henceforth oil companies will pay an income tax of 60 rather than 50 percent means more than slightly diminished oil profits from one country. For if Venezuela can unilaterally raise the tax levy, why can't other oil-rich but cash-hungry states?

H. W. Haight, president of Standard Oil of New Jersey's Venezuelan subsidiary which produces more than 40 percent of Venezuela's oil at a net profit for the first 9 months of 1958 of nearly $300 million, protests that:

> Venezuela becomes the first country in the world to break the 50-50 principle [for existing concessions], completely disregarding acquired rights and ignoring moral if not legal obligations to negotiate with interested parties. . . .

Why "moral if not legal"? Because if the companies claim that Venezuela is bound by *contract* not to alter the 50-50 division, they may be liable to US taxes on past profits which would amount to several billion dollars. But, on the other hand, if they accept Venezuela's action, they lay themselves open to similar bleeding in the Middle East.

Prior to 1943—in Venezuela and in the Middle East—oil companies had concession contracts with govern-

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ments under which they paid the local government a "royalty" on each barrel. They were then exempted from all local taxation, but paid taxes in the US on their profits.

This relationship was changed in 1943. Concessions in Venezuela were converted to licenses. The oil companies became—under the 50-50 principle—taxpayers in Venezuela, just like other taxpayers in that country. And they deducted their Venezuelan tax payments against US taxes.

There is nothing illegal or immoral in this arrangement, if in fact the companies have been paying a bona-fide income tax and not merely "conspiring" with the Venezuelan Government to reduce the impact of US taxes.

But the companies have been in a box ever since. By the 1943 agreement they surrendered their former contractual status. But to forestall local tax increases, they continue to speak (except to US tax authorities) in terms of contract.

The companies might reluctantly accept the sovereign right of Venezuela to boost the income tax, if only the squeeze could be contained. But they must consider Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Middle East states to whose income taxes they subjected themselves in 1950-1952, thereby further relieving themselves of tax burdens in the US. The consequence is that the oil industry must now rely on the sovereign integrity of not only Venezuela but of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar. The alternative is an industry demand that the US Government intervene and itself take some responsibility for setting oil profit and price patterns. But as the industry has often told us that would be nothing less than "creeping socialism."

Alford Takes His Seat

IN SPITE of the recommendation of the House Special Elections Committee that Dr. Dale Alford be denied a seat in Congress until his paste-in victory over "moderate" Rep. Brooks Hays of Little Rock is investigated, chances are that Dr. Alford will be taken into the fold on January 7.

The Committee's authority died with the last Congress. Its report is not binding on the new Congress. Two of the three who signed the majority report questioning "irregularities" in the Little Rock election will not be in the House this year—Rep. Keating (R, N.Y.) graduated to the Senate; Rep. Dennison (R, Ohio) was defeated November 7 and the third signer, Rep. O'Neill (D, Mass.) has no plans to challenge Alford from the floor. Northern Democrats are not likely to court Speaker Rayburn's wrath by stirring up a party ruckus in the first hours of the new session—and risk losing Southern votes for pet Northern projects later on. And Brooks Hays refuses to contest the election.

Mystique of the Drip

WE HAVE BEEN chided for an unflattering reference in these columns to the painting of the late Jackson Pollock, guiding star of the abstract expressionists and, according to the reprimand from *Art News* Executive Editor Thomas B. Hess, "probably the most influential artist of the past 15 years." Pollock was a vital and tragic figure, who came to dripmanship only after a conventional apprenticeship; there is no wish to demean his sincerity, though we do not pretend to understand what *Art News* critic Parker Tyler had in mind when he wrote that:

> the organic intuitiveness of Pollock's line has steadily pushed toward a wider range of expressiveness than Kandinsky's, because Pollock, despite his own zigzags and whorls has consistently avoided geometry for geometry's sake. Pollock has steadily sought a basic calligraphy.

Editor Hess reprimands us, however, for more than disrespect for what he terms the "masterpieces" of Pollock. He finds our comments on pictures betray "consistently sloppy thinking"; we are "uninformed," "stereotyped." In short, *The New Republic* is not esthetically "advanced." And *Art News* believes it ill-behooves a magazine with "advanced political ideas" not to share the "advanced" attitude of *Art News* toward art. It is an interesting indictment.

How does "advanced" criticism read?

> In the past two years, there has been a change in [Kline's] style. Not a drastic one; white and black forms still soar, tumble and stand in as permanent a state of instability as ever. But . . . the white paint is whiter, bluer, more snow-like. The black pigments differentiate themselves as fat and lean pigments. He endows the absence of totality of refraction with the range of the spectrum. This is achieved by an emotional intensity that seems to burn all the color out of art.

That is Mr. Hess' comment on a picture by Franz Kline—a picture that consists of a white canvas across which are laid some black girders.

If we understand *Art News* correctly, to be "modern" in one's taste is to prefer obscurity to clarity and to accept the new as synonymous with the admirable. We are asked to reject reflection and consciousness as impediments to the gurgle and gush of the unconscious. Give a man a pot of paint, a brush and a canvas tacked to the floor, and let 'er rip. The result is what *Art News* acclaims as "action painting."

"Action painting" is, of course, a legitimate and lively

NEXT WEEK

Aldous Huxley—Romantic Pessimist

by C. P. SNOW

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mode and "drip school" devotees have every right to soar, tumble or stand as they wish. Moreover, uninhibited daubing has recognized educational value for children in early grades and as a therapeutic device in certain instances of adult mental disorder. We part company with *Art News* only when the talk turns to "masterpieces" and when abstract expressionism is held aloft as the apogee of contemporary creativeness.

Khrushchev on Communes

AS WE REPORTED two weeks ago, the communes in Communist China were at first given little publicity in the Soviet Union. The tone was respectful, but in some instances there appeared to be deliberate twisting of the communes' significance. That guarded attitude has been shattered by a single contemptuous gesture of Mr. Khrushchev's.

In various official briefings since returning to the US from his eight-hour talk in the Kremlin, Sen. Hubert Humphrey has reported that Khrushchev ridiculed the commune as "very reactionary." The Soviet Premier knew that for all practical purposes he was speaking in public, that his remark was not for Humphrey's ears alone but for both the Chinese Communists and the European satellites.

When Humphrey raised the question of the new development in China, Khrushchev is said to have responded with a wink and words to the effect that "you and I know they won't work." The Senator wondered whether this pragmatic, or possibly cynical, position was in conformity with a cardinal tenet of Communist philosophy—"from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." To this, Khrushchev rejoined that the communes leave no room for what is most important to Communist states—production. His reference to the need for incentives prompted Humphrey to jibe that Khrushchev sounded like a capitalist; whereupon the Soviet Premier exclaimed: "Call it what you will, incentives are what get people to work harder."

Thank You, Massa

UNDER the heading, "Notice, Colored People Only," the Campus Theatre, in an ad in the *Denton, Texas, Record-Chronicle*, announced a "special screening" of the film, *Albert Schweitzer*, for Negroes.

"This will be the first time the colored people have ever been given an opportunity to see inside the beautiful Campus Theatre," wrote manager J. P. Harrison, "and I think, in fact, I know, that after they have seen this remarkable film . . . they . . . will have a newer and finer conception of what it means to be a citizen of these United States."

The Congress and Majority Rule

AS of this writing, a week before the 86th Congress convenes, it seems doubtful whether the power or conservative character of the House Rules Committee will be substantially altered—either by adopting a 21- or 14-day rule, or by enlarging the Committee's membership, or increasing the proportion of Democrats on the Committee. The decision is largely the Speaker's and Mr. Rayburn does not seem inclined to place his influence behind reform. It is my judgment, however, that almost the most needed New Year's resolution is not a change in the Committee's composition or authority, but a simple resolution, passed by the House of Representatives, which would abolish the Rules Committee and transfer its powers to a new majority policy committee chaired by the Speaker of the House and elected by Democratic Party caucus.

How do matters now stand?

Healthy, first-term Presidents, guided by the long perspectives of able civil servants, tend to be instruments of majority rule. Congress, on the other hand, wobbles between out-right minority rule (what Woodrow Wilson once called rule by "a disintegrate ministry"), and rule by Majority Leader and Speaker. But Majority Leader rule is not necessarily equivalent to *majority* rule. The Speaker is not necessarily the true majority's spokesman. Perhaps this is unfair. Perhaps the proper statement is that both Houses of Congress are presently ruled by distinguished leaders of disintegrate and timid majorities. But why are the majorities timid and disintegrate? Why are they not organized and courageous? Why has America not known firm and responsible majority rule in the Congress since 1915? The 100 days of the New Deal must be ruled out. This was not rational majority rule; this was Congressional (and bipartisan) default in a time of panic. In the years of danger which lie ahead, we cannot count on having this kind of "crisis consensus." By majority rule in Congress I mean rule in the interests of a majority of American citizens by a sufficient majority of the winning party in each House. Today, Congressional rule in the interest of a majority of American citizens is effectively strangled. The noose is not the Constitution. The noose is made up of strands of Congressional rules and procedures designed to rope off from majority control two citadels of power: white supremacy and big-farm, big-business influence over public policy.

Underlying the inordinate influence of the South and of economic privilege in the Congress is a collection of carefully cultivated myths. These myths have probably captivated or unnerved a sufficient number of Northern and Western Congressmen effectively to have immobil-

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ized last November's majority on key issues of Congressional organization and procedure.

Take the myth of seniority. The old-timers claim that no other system of selecting committee chairmen is automatic. If chairmen were to be selected by party caucus—by *ad hominem* judgments—Congress, it is reasoned (?), would be squeezed to death in infinite log-rolls.

This, of course, is one of the sillier rationalizations of this or any other century. But let us accept it. Let us assume that we wish to keep the seniority principle because it provides a method for automatic succession. But why should the majority's imagination be immobilized? There is a simple solution. At the beginning of every Congress, each Member could tote up the number of general (as distinct from primary) elections he has won against at least a 20-percent opposition vote. For these general election victories he would receive *double* credit for purposes of seniority. Seniority would still provide automatic selection; but power would gravitate into the hands of those who come from two-party districts in which partisan competition tends to search out the majority's interest.

A second myth is that, except on race issues, Southern Democrats are really National Democrats. Some bad political science has bolstered this myth with statistics. It takes the *Congressional Quarterly* to remind us that in this last session of Congress the Southerners bolted the National Democratic Party on 84 key roll calls. The issues? Housing, unemployment benefits, federal aid to education, slum clearance, taxes and a host of other matters that bother the majority of American citizens.

Perhaps the most important job before the Democratic National Committee is to create a truly national Democratic Party in the South. In some areas, this may necessitate a brand-new grass-roots organization. In others it means strengthening and registering existing National Democrats—Negro and white. For if National Democrats could organize the Congress, the power of the Eastlands and the Byrds could easily be contained.

There is a third myth. This one goes in and out of focus like a slide in an old kodachrome projector. It is that centralized control of each House of the Congress is dangerous to the freedom of individual members. This myth plays up to two human vanities: (1) the desire not to be subordinated; (2) the desire to avoid responsibility so as to avoid making enemies. The myth is a cruel one because the average Senator and Congressman *is* subordinated. Congressional behavior is not anarchic; it simply operates on the assumption that compromise will normally fall to the advantage of powerfully-entrenched minority interests. This subordination of the individual Member to an economic conservatism and a social reaction which is heedless of majority interests is at the crux of what ails the Congress. But the answer is not to end subordination; the answer is to achieve a responsible majority rule. Unfortunately, many liberals in Congress think the answer to existing minority rule *is* anarchy. They dislike the Rules Committee not only because it is conservative, but because it *rules*. With this in mind, liberals are busily working out devices to cut the power of the Rules Committee. But what is wrong with the Rules Committee is not that it rules, but that it rules irresponsibly, and for minority interests.

The ultimate cure is not to make it easier for temporary coalitions of Congressmen to break the power of the Rules Committee. Nor is the answer to strengthen the Rules Committee as an instrument of bipartisan coalitions in the Congress. The only answer that squares with majority rule and political responsibility is to make the Rules Committee an instrument of the majority party. This means the abolition of the Rules Committee in its present form, and its reconstitution as a majority policy committee under the chairmanship of the Speaker. Policy committee members would, of course, be chosen by caucus.

If this is the direction of political morality and responsible majority rule, House liberals should understand in advance that easier discharge petitions and 21- or 14-day rule—necessary as they may be in the short run—are in the long run potential *enemies* of responsible government. The legislative agenda *must* be narrowed. Traffic *must* be controlled. What the liberals should want is to *capture* power—not to dissipate, hamstring or by-pass it.

THE FINAL myth that immobilizes everyone is that America survives because its parties are meaningless. Any attempt to strengthen party responsibility, it is argued, will immediately divide the Congress and the nation into warring factions. We will no longer be "so fundamentally at one that we can safely afford to bicker." We get along now because we fuzz up responsibility and save everybody's political face. But this is nonsense. There is little chance of monolithic, tightly-disciplined parties developing—either inside or outside of the Congress. We still have separation of powers, staggered elections, federalism. The task of democratically-selected leaders and leadership committees in each House is to lead, not order; to provide a responsible focus of leadership on major issues; to act as a sympathetic bridge with the Executive and with the majority leadership in the other House on matters of national survival and the general welfare.

Let us develop the myth that legislators have a right to be ornery; but that when the orneriness has had its day, legislative machinery will be so constructed that compromises will fall in the direction of the interests of the *majority* of American citizens. Let us reaffirm the slogan: majority rule and minority rights. Let a National Democratic majority capture the legislative machinery to this end.

STEPHEN K. BAILEY

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How 1958 Looked

to MAULDIN and HERBLOCK

IN THE "ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH" IN THE "WASHINGTON POST"

"Ours talks"

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"It'll be interesting to find out what the other side is like"

RUSSIANS SCORE NEW PROPAGANDA VICTORY ON NUCLEAR TESTING ANNOUNCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION NUCLEAR POLICIES
ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICIES
HERBLOCK
©1958 THE WASHINGTON POST CO.

"You think this nuclear stuff really produces changes in people?"

"Sweetiepie, tell us little old judges in your own words what a scoundrel that Reuther is"



"It's just that we can't afford the money"

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Point of View

Virtuoso



"Backward, turn backward, O time, in your flight"

"And the best part is that *he's* paying us for the ride"

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Mao's "Big Family"

The Communes in Communist China

by STANLEY RICH

> AT DAYBREAK, bells ring and whistles blow to assemble. . . . In about a quarter of an hour the peasants line up. At the command of company and squad commanders, the teams march to the fields, holding flags. Here one no longer sees peasants in groups of two or three, smoking and going slowly and leisurely to the fields. What one hears are the sounds of measured steps and marching songs. The desultory living habits which have been with the peasants for thousands of years are gone forever . . .
>
> All the ties that bind the peasants are broken. . . . The frames of individual families which had existed for thousands of years have been completely smashed . . . Individualism has absolutely no market here.

THE TIME is the present. The scene is Communist China. The words are not George Orwell's but those of a nationally-distributed party magazine. The subject is a "people's commune," some 26,000 of which have since April swallowed 98.2 percent of China's half-billion rural populace. It is no happenstance that Peking calls the communes by the Confucian term, "Kung She," or "Grandfather Society." Substitute "the Communist Party" for "Grandfather" and the immediate aim of China's new "basic social unit" becomes clear: the complete destruction of the family system. The commune movement has further ends, of course. But Peking realizes that it can achieve none of these until it has first destroyed the family, that last possible breeding ground of organized resistance to Communist rule.

If this conclusion seems a bit strong, read from the Party's September theoretical journal, *Red Flag*:

> . . . We must undermine the capitalist type of social living built on the basis of the class exploitation system, and at the same time we must also undermine the family built on the basis of the class exploitation system. . . .
>
> That kind of family which carried out individual production with the family or the household as the unit . . . was nothing but a poor cage for the working people. . . . Individual domestic labor . . . is also a remnant of the family under the conditions of individual production. . . . In the socialist society [individuals] will no longer have to worry over their inability to establish or to maintain a most simple family. . . .
>
> In the socialist and communist collective body, everybody takes up labor with joy, and all jointly and reasonably share the fruits of their labor.

How is this to be done? By the simple expedient of physical separation. In the more advanced communes, children see their parents twice a month. Wives see their husbands only at mealtimes, which are given only half to eating and half to participating in discussions in vast communal mess-halls. Unless, of course, their husbands are "camping out" at work projects from 60 to 100 miles away from their commune base. Grandparents are isolated in "Happiness Homes" where they still serve the "big family" by tilling communal vegetable plots, weaving communal baskets or feeding communal chickens.

Even death is no escape. "We can't even bury our dead," one recent returnee from his now commune-ized birthplace told me. " 'Grandfather' has ordered everyone in our commune to participate in a fertilizer-collection campaign and bring in his monthly quota of 10 pounds of human bones."

Exactly what is a commune? To say merely that it is an administrative area under absolute party control is true enough, but gives no idea of the magnitude of the revolutionary concept involved. Only when compared with the collective that preceded it does the commune appear in its proper perspective.

The commune is *big*. The average commune as of the end of September holds 23,000 people. But the largest to date (in Kwangtung) numbers 300,000; another in Liaoning has 95,000. The collectives contained only a few dozen, at most a few hundred families.

The commune is *all-inclusive*. Whereas the collective concerned itself only with agricultural production, the commune supervises all agricultural, economic, cultural, political, social, educational, military activity in its boundaries. The commune, Peking says, is the *final step* toward

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the collective ownership of society as envisaged by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Unlike the collective, where members were allowed to own their own plots of land and private property, the commune is its own owner. Personal possessions are a thing of the past. Everything belongs to everybody.

Peking's claim that the commune "was not thought out at random" but is "the natural trend of the development of the socialist revolution and socialist construction" can be taken at face value. Communist China is almost fanatically determined to become an industrialized nation. But to do this she must have a manpower reservoir capable of being thrown at will into massive large-scale industrial, conservation, communications and other capital-construction projects too big for the diminutive and scattered collectives to handle. The creation of such a manpower pool is the main purpose of the fantastic commune scheme.

At last account, some 100 million women have been "liberated" from the house-keeping, husband-caring and child-tending duties of the anachronistic "small family" and are now working instead—on farms, in steel plants or communal tailoring shops—for the "big family" or "Grandfather Society." Children and oldsters are not exempt. A group of Young Pioneers (7- to 14-year-olds) in Canton recently smelted their first heat of medium-carbon steel. Inmates of a "Happiness Home" in Shansi are busily cultivating their own vegetable garden to provide food for the communal kitchen.

But even more important than this arbitrary increase in manpower is the fact that the new manpower is both mobile and inter-changeable. "When the farming season is brisk," boasts a Honan report, commune members "will be busy in the field; and when the slack season in agriculture arrives, they can work in the factories." The worker in the "Grandfather Society" is stripped of his technical identity. He may be a teacher one day, a farmer the next, a steel-smelter the next, depending on the desires of the commune cadres or, more likely, on the varying industrialization demands of the commune involved.

THE commune, moreover, aims to solve that administrative bane of Red China's existence—the continual siphoning off for personal use by the peasantry of agricultural produce which Peking must export to earn foreign exchange. This is no longer possible under the communal mess-hall system, which strictly rations food to all its inhabitants. (That this control is effective is evidenced by the sharp drop in overseas remittances to China through Hong Kong since the communes were established. Chinese in Hong Kong say it is useless to send money to their relatives on the mainland. The relatives write that no matter how much money they receive, they still get the same amount of food from their communal kitchens.)

Co-existent with these material aims of the commune (control of manpower and agricultural production) are encompassing spiritual aims which have appalled both the foreign observer and many of the roughly 15 million overseas Chinese living mainly in Southeast Asia. For, as Peking sees it, the commune resident must be stripped not only of his technical individuality but of his personal identity as well.

In the Yangchu'uan coal mine of Shansi—which, from current propaganda, appears to be serving as a pilot plant for eventual extension of the commune system to urban as well as rural areas—Communist Party control would appear to be reaching its ultimate. De-familized male miners are housed by work-shifts. Living with each shift is one party, one trade union and one Young Communist League official. Meal-times and off-hours are spent in intensive indoctrination sessions idolizing the cult of the "big family." Called the "five togethers"—"eat together, live together, work together, study together and play together"—this system, says the Yangchu'uan authorities in a masterpiece of understatement, "has an extremely far-reaching revolutionary significance."

Sparks of individualism may smoulder underneath the surface but are already being obscured by an external protective coloring of communal uniformity and drabness. Through a mass purchasing system, for example, residents of the Chingfeng commune of Honan are already wearing identical spectacles, shoes, vests and overcoats; using identical canes, bicycles, flashlights, watches, thermos bottles, toothbrushes and toothpaste; playing (the younger set) with identical rubber balls, toy autos and wooden rifles.

Institution of the wage system in these and other communes has so far been perhaps Peking's strongest weapon to enforce compliance. Rigged to demand a minimum of 28 working days per month, the system provides that commune members are paid *only* if they satisfy the "main requirements" of "attitude toward labor, production techniques and intensity of labor."

But ironically, even the wage system will disappear if the communes work out as Peking both plans and expects. For it has been made explicitly clear that in the "Grandfather Society" even money will eventually become meaningless. Within 6 to 10 years every one of China's by then near-billion population will be totally and solely dependent on the commune. At the moment, the communes are eliminating all "bourgeois" differences: between workers and peasants, between town and country, between mental work and manual work, between peasants and intellectuals, between collective ownership and ownership by the people. "In the past," boasts Ta Kung Pao, "the masses arranged their needs in the following order: 'first food, second clothing, and third [other] needs'. Today, the commune has enforced the 'four guarantees' and basically solved the problems of the members relating to food, residence, education and medical attention."

Tomorrow, Peking has further stated, the communes

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will have completely eradicated the concept of "unequal bourgeois rights" and will have ushered China into the final Utopia of true Communism where the "state will be limited to protecting the country from external aggression but will play no role at home."

Will Communist China's rulers succeed in their commune-ization attempt? Those who argue that they will not, that even the most efficient totalitarianism must eventually strike a bed-rock of human resistance, can present compelling evidence to support their conclusion.

As early as September 4th the English-language *Peking Review* admitted there was "vacillation," "rumor-mongering" and "sabotage" among China's "landlord and rich peasant elements." Last month came the belated news of extensive October purges in Liaoning and Shantung, where both provincial governors were among the party notables removed, and in the latter of which some 40,000 lesser party cadres were ousted from their posts. At present, Mao Tse-tung in Wuhan is quarter-mastering an almost unprecedented huddle of at least 16 of the party's all-powerful, 20-man Politburo and all of the party's provincial first secretaries. The conference has resulted in "slow-down" orders to over-zealous party cadres who are going too fast even for Peking. Since the meeting began in late November, for example, some communes have been ordered to return confiscated brick stoves; others, who pay their workers part in cash and part in grain, have been instructed to increase the money percentage. Commune cadres who requisitioned the stoves to provide lime for fertilizer (and on the grounds that all cooking would henceforth be done in the communal kitchens anyway) overlooked the fact that the stoves also provided the peasants' only source of warmth during the winter. And apparently many peasants, hungry as they may be, still nourish a bourgeois respect for cash as a "status" symbol.

(Current Peking reports indicate the Wuhan conference may also be considering Mao's rumored decision not to stand for "re-election" as Chairman of the Government in January. Even if true, any such decision by Mao would be a "red herring" so far as consideration of the communes is concerned. Long-time China observers here are unanimously agreed that so long as Mao remains as Chairman of the Communist Party—and not even the Formosa rumor-mill has suggested that he will not—he will still firmly control both the party and the government.)

Furthermore, even the propaganda reports of "100-percent enthusiasm" are increasingly contradictory. Multitudinous dispatches describing various communal-kitchen plans indicate "Grandfather" has not yet hit upon the single formula which will satisfy both the stomach and the soul of his children.

Against glowing claims of success for the communal "Happy Homes" must be balanced other official reports disclosing that one Kwangtung commune of 55,000 has a total of only 105 happy homesteaders, and that in the entire province of 37 million, only 40,000 oldsters—one-tenth of one percent of the population—are enjoying the blessedness of well-earned rest in the New China. Whether this contradiction proves that the Happiness Homes exist largely on paper, or that only the totally incapacitated are exempt from hard labor, it does indicate that China's communes are far from completion.

On the other hand, there is as much, if not more, to be said by those who feel that Grandfather Mao will indeed succeed in denuding his children of identity and transforming a fifth of the world's population into a faceless army answering only to the dictates of Peking.

First, it must be kept in mind that Mao's commune movement arose not from China's weakness but from China's strength. One observer has aptly described 1957 as China's "year of agony." Firmly in power and determined to industrialize, the party command was searching for a sure-fire means of tapping the nation's vast agricultural and industrial resources. The final decision: "voluntary" labor. Students and intellectuals left their classrooms and professions by the hundreds of thousands to serve "socialist construction" in mammoth irrigation, farming and reforestation projects in the far north and northwest. By the end of the year, the Communist leaders looked down on what had been created and declared it good. If the application of massive manpower could achieve a doubled agricultural output in only one year, what could not be achieved by incorporating that principle into China's basic social structure! Thus arose the commune system.

Second, the party is approaching commune-ization in an undeniable mood of confidence. As if its 1957 "leap forward" were not enough, acts of omission by Soviet Russia and of commission by the United States have added fortuitously to the party's optimism. Peking propagandists have all but openly boasted that the commune movement has launched China into the era of pure Communism whereas Soviet Russia is still mired in the transitional stage of socialism. US action in the Formosa Straits (though not deliberately provoked for the purpose as some observers have suggested) is nevertheless serving the party well as a "paper tiger" with which to bring an otherwise reluctant peasantry into line.

Third, unlike the strong-arm methods employed in its 1951 land-reform movement and its business-reform movements of 1952-53, the party this time is bending backward not to push too hard. The emphasis, as the results of the Wuhan Conference attest, is on making haste slowly. Although the over-all scheme is dogmatic, the tactics are not. Of the 26,425 communes set up through September this year, no two are absolutely identical. The party is waging an eclectic, trial-and-error struggle to determine firstly which system is best for which areas, then eventually to devise an over-all com-

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mune standard for the country as a whole. If the struggle fails, it will not be because the party neglected to take a long, hard look before it leaped.

Finally, party control in China is greater today than it has ever been, exceeding even that in the Soviet Union. (Speculation that this control might be endangered by the current "Every Man A Soldier" movement is erroneous. Contrary to her propaganda claims, Peking is arming no one who might turn against her. Militia "shock brigades" are limited to men between 16 and 30 and women between 17 and 22, with arms going even then only to "activists who have been selected after undergoing a rigid test in their attainments in becoming Communist and expert.") Certainly there is widespread objection, particularly among the intellectuals, to the commune system. But unarmed disillusionment is no effective answer to armed party power. Only last month Peking admitted the suppression since 1956 of four armed revolts (in one of which at least 100 Communist cadres were killed) in the predominantly Moslem northwest province of Kansu. Yet today Kansu is among the 15 China provinces which have already achieved 100 percent commune-ization. Spokesmen for the West have protested long against that glaring error in World Communist theory which persists in regarding the West not as she is today but as she was 30 years ago—a "capitalist" society controlled by Wall Street at the expense of the underdog working "proletariat." Yet, in judging the people's communes, it is imperative that the West not fall into this same damaging error.

Communist China, too, no less than the United States, is not what she was 30 years ago. It would be fallacy indeed to luxuriate in the anachronistic concept of 400 million pig-tailed customers but a few steps advanced from the Stone Age. Strength, confidence, luck, caution and, above all, iron-fisted Communist Party control, are all playing into Peking's hands. They are the symbols of today's New China, symbols both guiding and supporting the nation's leadership in its drive to achieve ultimate commune-ization. The communes *may not* work; such total destruction of the individual has never before been tried. But to say that they *cannot* work is to indulge in an optimism unsupported by present facts and potentially dangerous to the West's own future.

Middle East Irreconcilables

by WALTER Z. LAQUEUR

THE PRESENT reading on the Middle East political barometer, as the new year begins, is one of heavy storms ahead. If this forecast is correct, the Suez crisis of 1956, the tension over Syria in 1957, the Lebanese civil war and the *coup d'etat* in Baghdad may only have been preludes to a much bigger, and certainly more decisive conflict: The struggle for leadership in the Arab world between Nasser and his allies and the Communists and their supporters. For the first time since 1954, Nasser last week openly attacked Communist maneuvers in Syria and warned that "we shall smite down anybody who is opposed to Arab nationalism." In comparison, the clashes between President Nasser and King Hussein, between Tunisia and the UAR, between Khartoum and Cairo (which may not have ended with the recent military coup) are mere sideshows. Even the Arab-Israeli conflict is of less importance. In my opinion, it is highly unlikely that an open conflict between the two major centers of power in the Arab world could be postponed for more than several months. King Hussein's overthrow in Jordan, strangely enough, would only precipitate the conflict. There may be full agreement between Cairo and Baghdad about the necessity to remove the last of the Hashemites, but there is no agreement at all as to the identity of his successor. The "liberation" of Jordan by a homemade *coup* with, or without, foreign help would almost immediately lead us into a new crisis.

Divisions between historical periods are usually less clear-cut in actual fact than in the textbooks. Some overlapping is apparently always unavoidable. The struggle between the Hashemites and Nasser is not yet quite over though the outcome was never really in doubt, and the end may be near. But the new phase in the struggle for the Middle East has already started between the Nasser-Ba'ath coalition against the Communists and their allies.

The Ba'ath—originally a group of young radicals in Syria—established a political party some eight years ago and sought to gain influence in the army, the peasant movement and the trade unions—but mainly in the army. Its program promised everything to everybody: the party was to be nationalist-socialist-popular-progressive, demanding reforms in all walks of life, higher living standards, the destruction of feudalism, nationalization of

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physical resources and a republican-parliamentary regime. It attracted many followers, especially among the intelligentsia, first in Syria and subsequently other Arab countries such as Jordan and Iraq. It was essentially a revolt of the younger generation of nationalists against traditionalists and conservatives. While very emphatic in their foreign political demands, their domestic program, including their socialism, is somewhat vague. Their attitude toward Colonel Nasser was one of critical support (they criticized the absence of democratic freedoms in Egypt) until about a year ago. Since January, 1958, however, they have closely collaborated with the Egyptian junta; the merger between the Egyptian and Syrian "provinces" (the UAR) came about mainly because of their efforts.

LITTLE need be said about the Communists in the Arab world, for the structure of their parties, their activities and programs closely resemble those of other Communist parties all over the world, or in the East, at any rate. They emerged as a political factor of first-rate importance in Syria three years ago, and more recently in Iraq, but are also well represented in other Arab countries. In Eygpt some of their leaders are in prison, while others belong to the middle echelons of the state apparatus—an interesting though not unprecedented division of labor. In Syria they are tolerated within limits; their leader Khaled Bakdash recently returned from his self-imposed East European exile to Damascus and resumed his activities which include the publication of a daily newspaper.

Both camps in the struggle for domination over the Arab national movement profess friendship for the Soviet Union, though in varying degrees, while disagreeing on domestic policies. This new split in the Arab world has caused little surprise in Moscow, for it has considered such a development unavoidable in the long run. The Ba'ath never really had a good press in the Soviet Union and Moscow's support for Nasser has always been based on the assumption that the Cairo leader headed the most radical force in the Middle East and the one most sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Since Communism emerged as a significant force in Iraq, this assumption had to be partly modified.

But if the split is unavoidable in the long run, it could be a calamity from the Soviet point of view if it should come too early. The Communists are not yet strong enough to take over the entire Arab world and a successful bid for power in *one* Arab country could cause a stiffening of resistance in others.

One year ago most citizens of Jordan would probably have opted for union with Egypt. They were not asked then and they will not be consulted if a revolt should take place in Amman in the near future. But all observers agree that many Jordanians would be much more reluctant to commit themselves now than a year ago—Iraq has made all the difference. If Iraq has not joined the UAR, why should Jordan? Neither the Communists nor the other political groupings (with the sole exception of the Ba'ath) are too happy about their prospects under Nasser.

The Arab national movement always stood for unity; the fact that there was agreement on little else did not really matter, for unity was the overriding aim, and its realization seemed far off. In recent years, however, many obstacles to unity have been removed, the goal seems now much nearer than it ever was, and as a result various leaders and groups within the Arab national movement have come to disagree sharply on the ultimate meaning of unity. For Arab unity would merely constitute the new framework and what about the socio-political order in the new Arab state, or states? According to Cairo it should be ultimately *ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuehrer*, or at any rate one political regime and a central leadership. Baghdad agrees with the concept of one Arab nation, but not with the idea of one state, and certainly not with the UAR form of government.

The opposition of Iraq's General Qassem to closer unity with Egypt and the arrest of Ba'ath leaders in Iraq have been hailed in the West as setbacks to both Cairo and Moscow. But setbacks to President Nasser's projects are not necessarily a source of grave disappointment to the Soviet Union. For Communism in Iraq has now emerged as the strongest single force in the country, stronger than in Syria, which was considered for several years the chief Communist bulwark in the Middle East.

Up to very recently Arab Communists used to deprecate their own political importance in order not to arouse doubts and suspicions among their nationalist allies; according to some of their spokesmen, the talk about "Communist activities" was so much Western imperialist propaganda. Now the Communists have dropped their traditional modesty, because for the first time they can afford to. In an open letter to President Qassem, the Iraqi Party has stated that "we are the strongest group, and the one most able to mobilize the widest forces in defense of the Republic. Nobody can deny this and refuse to admit it." The Iraqi General and Colonels and the politicians who collaborate with them (leaders of the Istiqlal party and the National Democrats) are generals without an army. For reasons of their own, the politicians and the army officers opposed complete unity with the UAR; they had to fight the Ba'ath. But they needed Communist help to organize mass demonstrations and delegations demanding "severe punishment" for the pro-Nasser plotters. The Communists have always preferred, for obvious reasons, Arab federation to Arab unity. In Syria last January, the Communists could not dare openly to oppose Arab unity; the Ba'ath held all the trump cards, the Syrian army command was with few exceptions in the hands of the Ba'ath.

The situation in Iraq is much more favorable from the Communist point of view: the Ba'ath, the only serious rival of the Communists so far as the manipulation of the masses is concerned appeared on the Baghdad scene only recently; its influence is mainly restricted to Iraqi colleges

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and schools. In Syria, the Communists had to collaborate with the Ba'ath; in Iraq, they feel free now to attack them for "not being socialists but extreme nationalistic adventurers who oppose political freedom." For the Ba'ath and its influence is resented in Iraq not only by the Communists but also by the National Democrats and the Istiqlal. Communist cooperation with these parties, in particular with the National Democrats, dates back more than ten years; while the Communists were underground, the National Democratic Party was used by them as a "front." Even so, the National Democrats of 1948 were an independent party; if there was a working alliance with the Communists, they were undoubtedly the senior partner. By January of 1959, they have been reduced to very junior status; the Communists still need them for tactical reasons and as a go-between with General Qassem. But the National Democrats need the Communists more.

The Ba'ath is presently the only effective political rival of the Communists in the Arab world; whether it will also be a formidable competitor in the long run is more questionable. By dissolving the Ba'ath in Iraq, General Qassem has opened the way to power to the Communists. This, of course, is not the way he sees it: Qassem is firmly convinced that he is merely playing one political group against another, and that he will discard the Communists the very same way he got rid of the Ba'ath. That is, to say the least, a very optimistic assumption, for behind Qassem there stand only some army officers and politicians whereas the Communists today have the only effective political organization in the country. Qassem is political innocence personified; in contrast to him President Nasser is a sophisticated and far-sighted political thinker. (But then, to be quite fair, Nasser has been in power for six years, and Qassem less than six months.) Qassem may, of course, succeed in outmaneuvering the Communists for a short while; he may even try to escape into union with Egypt after realizing the full consequences of his actions. But it is doubtful whether he will be able to get rid again of the ghosts he conjured.

From the Soviet point of view the unfolding conflict between Baghdad and Cairo is inopportune. While the Baghdad regime is now more "progressive" in Soviet eyes, Russia would prefer to maintain good relations with both camps. To keep Nasser happy, Moscow has chosen to offer Egypt some help toward the building of the Aswan Dam. Helping to step up Arab-Israeli tension is another useful device to distract Nasser. It would, at least temporarily, reunite the Arabs and compel Nasser to put up with what are for him undesirable developments in Baghdad. A study of the Soviet press and radio during the last couple of weeks tends to show that such action has been given active consideration. The Soviet press has been even more violent than the Egyptian newspapers in denouncing "Israeli aggressive military preparations."

If power in Iraq should pass into Communist hands, a reconciliation between Nasser and the West would be at least a theoretical possibility. But it is somewhat doubtful whether Moscow is very much concerned about such a possibility. Egypt's economy has become very much dependent on Soviet-bloc trade and aid. True, economic considerations alone would probably not be decisive—they did not prevent Tito from bolting. More important is the general political and psychological climate in the United Arab Republic, largely (but not only) created by Nasser himself. After so many years of violent tirades against the West a *volte face* would be difficult, and it is not certain whether Nasser's regime would survive it. This must be known to Nasser and it is doubtful whether he will work for a rapprochement with the West—except perhaps *in extremis*. But Moscow certainly does not want to drive Nasser into such desperate action: the Soviet leaders will counsel moderation to their comrades in Baghdad who will be requested to share political power for the time being rather than monopolize it.

Such a compromise could work temporarily, but it is unlikely to last for much time. Developments in the Middle East have a momentum of their own and even Moscow's advice is not invariably followed. The movement for Arab unity has tried to combine and reconcile what are basically incompatible group interests: The "bourgeois nationalists" and the Communists. An alliance between these groups can temporarily be maintained as the experience of national movements elsewhere has shown—but never for very long.

The two camps are admittedly less clearly divided in the Middle East than elsewhere: the Communists appear as Arab nationalists, or at any rate as national Communists, whereas the "bourgeois nationalists" have strong pro-Soviet sympathies and may talk frequently in what sounds very much like Communist phraseology. But it need hardly be stressed that behind this façade of community of interests there is an irreconcilable conflict that cannot be done away with by speeches and political legerdemain. The Communists want to share power, and ultimately to take over, while the Arab nationalists have no intention of giving up their positions. Up to the Baghdad revolution, all this might have been considered somewhat academic because Communism was not yet a major force in the Arab world. Since then everything has changed, and what was a long-term perspective has now become a topical problem of decisive importance. To be sure, Arab leaders have buried the hatchet from time to time, even Nuri as-Said, Hussein and Nasser temporarily patched up their differences. But basic conflicts will out. The new phase in the struggle for power in the Middle East is already on. It is an internal Arab struggle that will continue. Whether it will provide fresh opportunities for Western policy in the Middle East is by no means certain.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Curse of Refinement

by T. J. Ross

A BASIC FEATURE of the new English writers is their hostility to the mandarin aesthetic of the Eliot era. This holds true as much for Colin Wilson as it does for John Wain; for Kingsley Amis, as for Iris Murdoch. None of them thinks of himself as speaking the language, or deploying the methods of, a royal clique. In their rejection of mandarinism, their own work tends to be shot through with tips on aesthetics, like this one from John Wain's novel, *The Contenders*:

> These drawings had been done without a thought in his head except "Here's something I want to draw—where's a bit of paper." There was no bunk about forming an individual style, interpreting this and interpreting that, the whole thing coming through from the head instead of straight from inside.

In like manner, the hero of Kingsley Amis' *I Like It Here* meditates about how a seminar of good gray graduate students would describe a landscape-with-fisherman:

> The whole . . . would have sunk without trace under the assaults of their personal vision, their "comment," their subordination of inessentials . . . what gave them the idea they knew what they meant by an inessential, much less could pick one out?

Compare Amis' point with this sort of thing taken from a member in good standing of the older team:

> I had discovered [a story by one Tchang T'ien-Yih] in a French magazine, and had been deeply impressed by the simplicity and power with which it described the sufferings of peasants and soldiers somewhere in the huge spaces of China, at some timeless moment in what seemed an eternal civil war: almost unbearable, so absolutely naked of all inessentials, and yet so beautifully done, so full of human feeling and at the same time so completely without sentimentality that it seemed to me a near perfect example of writing that drove its implicit lesson home far more effectively than any straightforward propaganda could by being a work of art.

This is from John Lehmann's memoir, *The Whispering Gallery*. We may note here how the critic's delighted chill at this story of a Faraway Event is coupled to his assurance that it's "beautiful." That is to say, a tale about the "sufferings of peasants and soldiers *somewhere* . . ." is nonetheless guaranteed to provide fare which any person of refinement could read safely—or, to use the more familiar term, "objectively." For, though "full of human feelings" the story is not (thank heaven!) "sentimental."

Mr. Lehmann's memoirs have many fetching qualities and I've not cited his paragraph as a reflection on his book as a whole, but as a "near perfect example" of the academic idea of Kosher culture. It is this idea which the new English writers refuse to represent.

For them the creative act is an aggressive act: it is attacking; it is, in Nietszche's phrase, a "discharge of energy." Thus, the hero of *I Like It Here* muses impatiently about "the reputed rule that none but aesthetic considerations must go into the shaping of a work of art"; when he thinks of "doing" his mother-in-law he imagines the result would be "a star-shot blood-red awesome pall of hatred." All this in fun, yet a serious and, for these days, a useful point has been made, one which allows for the breaking out of emotional and aesthetic straitjackets. Most straitjacketing of all is the effort to mask the surging human impulse in the name of some high-minded flim-flam which society will welcome as Truly Refined.

Amis' *Lucky Jim* points the moral perfectly. Its comedy depends on the uncompromising illumination of how the connection of culture counter with social class has affected the educational domain. After spending several years in so class-bound a system as the military "service" the "lucky" new men were marched back to the "shelter" of the Academy only to find their culture-kits being examined with all the frenzied thoroughness of an Army officer's cleanup inspection of a barracks on a Saturday morning. No longer being in uniform, however, they have refused to join passively in the requisite gamesmanship, for they see no reason why the school should become the playpen of genteel hobbyists.

It is important to keep in mind that this aspect of the new writing is *not* the result of a "redbrick" university schooling. To stress the motivation of a "redbrick" provincialism in the new writing would be seriously to undercut its significance and interest. Amis and Wain are Oxford products; Iris Murdoch teaches there. From the internal evidence of *Mr. Nicholas* I would gather Hinde is also ex-Oxford. Osborne, like Shakespeare and Shaw before him, has had no formal "training" in education beyond the secondary level. These writers, then, do not represent that ground-level of mediocrity which "redbrick" implies. Their attack on the educational system reflects on its highest echelons. Nor do they rely on convenient scapegoats like "the administration" or "the public." It is the key figures—the scholars and the pedagogues—with whom they are concerned.

Even indirect reference is of a hostile nature. When Thomas Hinde, in his *Mr. Nicholas*, wants to suggest one cause for irritation between a suburban father and son, he does so by analogy to an academic habit. " 'Yes we used to do that, sit up all night talking about the problems of life'. Peter wanted to laugh at the way he made anything anyone else did seem dull by putting it in a category."

JOHN WAIN takes a more deliberate aim. His *Preliminary Essays* might have been subtitled *Preliminary Attack on the Academy*. The book is packed with remarks like "the dead hand of academicism which kills everything it touches," or "if you are going to be an academic poet be stupid." In a recent essay Mr. Wain has scolded both Eliot and Auden for "adopting a tone of exaggerated respect for academic opinion" (missing the point, in Eliot's case, that he has always shown a commendable knack for spotting true friends; if Auden thinks the Academy "likes" him, he's making a mis-

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take: it does not find his work easy to seminarize.)

Much more than random carping is involved in the picture of the higher academic compound which the new English writers have been presenting us. That their interest goes deep is evident in how frequently they go out of their way to offer concrete, point-by-point suggestions for change; Wain devotes the last chapter of his *Preliminary Essays* to a plea for changing the silly program for English studies. His essays, like those of his fellow writers, contain some of the most sensible comments I've read anywhere about modifying official requisites which serve only to waste everyone's time and homogenize mediocrity.

IN THEIR ESSAYS, the new writers have tagged specific official stupidities; in their fiction they have made hay with the equally stupid unofficial requisites. They have noted how Toby jugs, recorders, "filthy Mozart," winemanship, and World Travels go along with the indecent doses of Great Chains of Being, Rebirth Patterns, Merrie Medievalism, Aesthetic Values and similar guff which are crammed down the parched throats of captive "students"—all done, not for the sake of pursuing anybody's objective truth, or even any pretense at such—but for the sake of turning out robots of Refinement who, by God, will look and act —"right."

Which means merely acting like an upper class English gentleman, or worse, some anxious peasant's idea of what such a notable specimen should act like.

Just as it is the English writers who have so far best "handled" the influence of the popular arts on the quality of everyday living, so too have they been the first to dramatize the sad connection between the requisites of the educational machine to the style—and fantasies—of the upper middle class. The new writers have seen the academic realm as the chief contributor to, and codifier of, specious formalisms—both social and intellectual—which are massively antithetical to energy, decent conduct, and what academicians refer to as "creativity."

Insofar as a resistance to the forms of the educational arena is really a resistance to the formalities of the upper middle class, books like *Lucky Jim* strike a certain "universal" note, for resistance to specious formalisms is a distinguishing feature of independent youth today. There is nothing "insular" in the spirit of the new writing. I would bet that if *Lucky Jim* were translated tomorrow into Hindustani, Hebrew, or Japanese it would be an immediate hit. For by now the symbolism of a Toby jug or of Vivaldi or Gluck will be perfectly interpretable to anyone who has ever beheld a cycling pedagogue, or whose effort to get out of the paddy field meant enduring an interview in which what really counted was how one's refinement-rating would stack up.

On this score, the reception of *The Outsider* in this country may serve as an example. Granted that Colin Wilson's effort lacked a certain weight, the rage it met with did seem a bit out of proportion. The academic reviewers uniformly blazed with that "star shot blood-red awesome pall of hatred" which Mr. Amis dreamed of aiming at his mother-in-law. Their loss of Objectivity and Detachment was remarkable. Even their Sense of Humor stopped being Wry. They dug in and blasted away. But they never did see the point. Instead, our academicians "evaluated" Wilson's book as philosophy, though philosophizing was obviously not his intention. They hissed too about his lack of credentials, but never specified the sort they thought he should possess. And because he wasted no time in stylistic trimmings, yet dealt rather lucidly with some difficult issues, they suspected him of lack of Refinement. The products of a lifetime spent in fulfilling requisites — or else dishing them out, they were appalled by Wilson's lack of a bureaucratic fastidiousness. To sum up, they treated Wilson as if he were an artist—which he isn't. He is simply one more "concerned party" whose book is a worthwhile example of how to "attack a subject" rather than simper over it. One of the most bracing aspects of present day English culture is this graceful "attacking" mode among its artists, critics, and new educators.

We have nothing like it here. The main breeder of our own cultural depression is our educational machine and its "scholarships"—a scholarship conducive of results which have proved to be, alas, merely "ironic."

After ponderously cranking out that first pea-pod "study," which will gain him tenure, our "scholar" slips simperingly into the role of Refinements Leader of his community. After years spent in curtseying to the seminar-leaders who control his tiny fate, he "earns" his degree by yielding up every jot of the critical or scholarly abilities he might, in some rare cases, have begun with. Not until he has collapsed under the bamboozling he is forced to endure, and, at last, croaked out "I love Big Requisite!" is he stamped with the official Good Refinement Seal of approval, and packed off to represent civilization at some Outpost of Progress in the mysterious Mid-

Definition of Creative Art

by Boris Pasternak

WITH SHIRT wide open at the collar,
Maned as Beethoven's bust, it stands;
Our conscience, dreams, the night and love,
Are as chessmen covered by its hands.

And one black king upon the board:
In sadness and in rage, forthright
It brings the day of doom—against
The pawn it brings the mounted knight.

In gardens where from vaults of ice
The stars in fragrance rise of old,
Tristan still sings like a nightingale
On Isolde's vine, smothered by cold.

The gardens, ponds, and fences, made pure
By burning tears, and the whole great span
Of creation—are only forms of passion
Hoarded in the heart of man.

Translated from the Russian by Eugene M. Kayden

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west. But when our scholar, who is by now what is known as the mildly depressive type, finds all the colorful natives of this community staring toward him in feverish anticipation of a sample of refinement, the best he can do is offer to join the natives in a game of golf.

This leads to frustration on all sides and new anxieties on the part of the certified Neanderthal, who now begins secretly hoking up his culture kit with the same stupid meticulousness with which he prepared for that Third Degree. But the years spent in meeting, and learning to love, Big Requisite, have taken their toll. He develops a Twitch, which all the natives take to be a symbol of Sensitivity; his wife, meanwhile, who married him in the dream of enjoying a refined future, but is beginning to have doubts, nevertheless flatters him by telling him he is a Disturbed Personality —like Dostoevsky. And so we come round to that heart-warming aspect of the contemporary scene: the faculty coffee "klatsch" in which members of the team sit around comparing notes on their Disturbances the way office girls during lunch time sit around chatting airily about their pregnancies.

In recent years one way of getting round this destiny has been discovered and generally approved: this is to take out a charter membership in the Poet-Teachers Association. The poet-teachers rarely twitch. The academic Pashas like to have them around since it gives them the sensation of safely flirting with Art. Besides, everyone smilingly recognizes the wee compositions of these apostles of joy as suitable fulfillments of requisites on the way to honorary degrees, promotions and handouts.

MEANWHILE, down in the depths where our secret weapon, the Teachers College, looms proudly in the murk, no one, needless to say, has ever heard of John Lehmann—let alone Dostoevsky. Refinement, though, remains the Key to Success: this time the idea of being rightly "English" is not based on the refinements of the literary pose but rather on the charm of the telephone operator in all her immaculate fetchingness. By now Teachers College Charm has become recognizable a mile away. It stamps one like a Cockney accent. It is a result of the policy of our commissars of public education, who, like the other dictators of our age, believe that the "masses" require Special Treatment. We may note, then, that it is in the booming playpens of that night-mare of the Non-Controversial, the Teachers College, that a new American proletariat is being untrained. There is a chance, however, that I have placed the Teachers College in the wrong category; possibly it doesn't belong under the heading "Education" at all—but, more properly, under the heading of "Popular Culture"—like TV.

So far, the "creative" efforts of our own academicians to "see" our present educational mess, let alone legislate for it, have been so careful to be Fair to All Sides, so fatuously "Eternal," that they add up to being no more than a continuation of the drone of the committee room by other means. Despite all this, I remain optimistic. I like to feel that cultural historians a hundred years hence will record among the extra-literary values of *Lucky Jim* the fact that it proved to be the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the Anglo-American academic compound.

What's Happened to O'Hara

by Saul Maloff

LATE in the long opening section of *Ten North Frederick,* when the funeral is over and Joe Chapin has been put away by the indifferent gravediggers, and his rich, powerful friends have returned to their clubs and Wall Street and State Street offices, a minor character observes: "When you get a group like that together they take one look at each other and they know right away who belongs and who doesn't. Maybe they never saw each other before and don't even know what the other does, but there's an American type, or maybe fifty American types, and they're all used to having authority." As an ironist, as a deft and sympathetic observer of manners O'Hara has tended to lose critical distance and force with each successive book, until now he has become wholly intoxicated with those fifty types, wholly absorbed by the monied and the powerful (as against money and power—themes which the great French novelists knew very well what to do with). O'Hara had even before this given us nearly that many types, and now he has given us the full count: not single, separate persons, but types—all he has known, read about, heard tell of. In *From the Terrace,* his newest, longest (nearly 900 pages), most expensive, and most pretentious novel, O'Hara has set out to give us the big Summing Up.

From the Terrace, by John O'Hara (Random House; $6.95).

O'Hara is not content to give us merely fifty years of the Life and Times of Raymond Alfred Eaton (b. 1897); he must give us as well the declining years and times of his grandfather and of his father (an iron man of the iron age: "It was the last time in the history of the world when hate, envy, greed, heroism, kindness and love were acceptable in themselves without further scrutiny.") What begins as a nostalgia for the past, a craving to recover and possess it, soon becomes a crazy antiquarianism, a wild accumulation of oddities and lore and local color, the sentimentality of a newspaper morgue, the writer's grievously mistaken belief that a sense of the past will somehow be evoked if only that stupendous array of facts can be stacked still higher. It is not enough that we know when Eaton was born—we must know the circumstances surrounding his conception and how long his mother was in labor; we are given not one war but all the wars of his lifetime (including the Spanish-American and the Mexican Border); not the Princeton years only but the grade school and prep school years; all the dances, the drinks and dinners, the parties; all the business ventures, the career in high finance and the career as Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Second World War; all the loves and all the sexual encounters (all in all, probably the record in world fiction, but still, if you look closely, reducible to a single encounter with minor variations). Nothing is omitted.

Everything is there save what matters: the controlling intelligence; the moral imagination; the great novelist's unerring feeling for the dramatic center and the crucial revelation of that which the social historian does not see or sense; the sense of the depths beneath the teeming, glittering surface and the appropriate

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form of their statement; the power to discover for the imagination and to tell what it was really like then, and later, and what it is to be human, *this* man, that woman. The *facts* of life, not the "facts of life."

When a novelist of demonstrated gifts has come so entirely to mistake facts for truth, statistics for reality, deftness for depth, he writes social history and fictional biography. Painful though it is to watch, O'Hara presents us with the very machinery of his mischievous decision, in *italics*. In an elegiac prologue spoken by the novelist-biographer, O'Hara writes:

> *It might be entertaining . . . to go over the life of Alfred Eaton for the purpose of selecting half a dozen items of information that would tell how he behaved in various circumstances, and to use other items by which he consciously or inadvertently revealed what he thought. As it happens, however, our purpose is not only to characterize Alfred Eaton; it is something more ambitious than that, and more ambitious than the characterization of the lives of the men and women and children whose lives he touched, whose lives touched his.*

And later in the novel a character remarks: ". . . most writers have a tendency to gloss over things. . . . I think about the lives of the people I've known, some of them pretty interesting, but nobody'd ever put them in a book, because everybody has that tendency to gloss over things." Had we been given those "items" (even the word suggests his contempt for selection and construction) that tell how he behaved and those "other items" by which he revealed what he thought, we might have had a modestly good O'Hara novel; but he elected instead to gloss over nothing, to tell us not only that Eaton had liver and bacon for lunch but that he had cabinet pudding for dessert, followed by a *large* coffee with cream and sugar.

What has happened to O'Hara the novelist of *manners*, to O'Hara the moralist—and these are the most valuable qualities of his best early work—is even more damaging, for the novelist of manners in the literary sense has become a novelist of manners in the dancing-school sense. This most recent O'Hara shows us truculence and intransigence and calls them principle and integrity; locker-room loutishness and thinks it buoyant good spirits; mistakes a hundred beds for the vital life; takes the manor house for the best of all possible worlds; presses upon us prigs and bores and insists that they are gentlemen; and supposes for 900 pages that his principal prig who becomes a bore and finally an unmitigated and unrelentingly vulgar bore is as much of a tragic hero as our bronze age deserves.

But from this disaster I take whatever hope I can find. Awed as he now is by the monied and powerful types he has undertaken to chronicle, his heart is not really in it, his instincts as a novelist remain unruly and rebel against what his mind espouses. For when one looks carefully and sees what O'Hara has really *dramatized* in his best and most vital pages (some brief scenes early in the book before all the vitality goes out of it), then one can see beyond the possibility of error that everything O'Hara truly sees refutes everything he merely professes. The flashes are only sporadic, and they soon die out, but they were lively once, and could live.

MOVIES

A Not-So-Grand Hotel

HOTELS are perennially popular settings for plays and films, for they provide societies in miniature. But the hotel play rarely overcomes the patness of the self-conscious cross-section. The man in *The Voice of the Turtle* said he disliked plays where "a lot of people all get caught together in a catastrophe and all face death in a lump"; I would extend that to include plays about people caught together in a hotel who face life the same way.

Separate Tables (Hecht-Hill-Lancaster);

However, *Separate Tables*, Terence Rattigan's exploration of a not-so-Grand Hotel, is one of the more acceptable examples of the type. Rattigan is an extraordinarily deft craftsman who has been flirting for twenty years with serious drama and has occasionally almost been caught *in flagrante delicto*. This work consists of two long one-act plays set in a shabby English seaside hotel. Each of the plays concerns two different major characters, and part of its theatrical effectiveness was that both sets of leading roles were played by the same two actors.

The film version interweaves the two plays so that, necessarily, the four leading roles are played by four actors, not two; thus the opportunity for virtuoso display is lost. But since the virtuosi involved are Burt Lancaster and Rita Hayworth, we can be reconciled to the loss—particularly since the two other parts are done very well indeed by David Niven and Deborah Kerr.

Lancaster plays a sodden journalist whose life has been corroded by a woman; Miss Hayworth is the woman, who has herself been driven to drugs by her need for him. They are, as another character says, "two people who slash each other when they're together and slash themselves when they're apart." The film provides justification for two Americans in the parts, but these particular Americans are inadequate. As a producer Lancaster is a man of taste and ambition who has brought much interesting material to the screen; but as an actor he lacks virtually everything but earnestness and intelligence. His voice is not an affecting instrument, his face assumes expressions but conveys nothing of inner states, and the net effect of his presence is heaviness. Unblessed (in my view) with talent, Lancaster is nevertheless a powerful box-office magnet. One assumes that the explanation is biological.

Miss Hayworth, too, was for some years a famous sex-idol; now time has begun to treat her with its customary cruelty. Forced to rely on her acting ability, she elicits an inappropriate pathos. In this film she plays a woman steeped in neurosis but does not convince us that she is capable of more than the mildest tremor.

THESE performances suffer further by comparison with the fine supporting cast. (Lancaster, the producer, is neither stingy nor vain.) Niven, hitherto a pleasant but predictable actor, here successfully essays a fraudulent, seedy army type, a portrait of a caricature, complete with obvious toupee, egregious moustaches, and overdone pukka lingo. This fake major, who hates himself and his loneliness about equally, is impelled

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Notes on Contributors

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to pinch women in movie theatres and is finally arrested and written up in the press. His action first repels, then evokes sympathy in a mother-dominated spinster in the hotel, who is movingly played by Miss Kerr in tight, dull hair-do and repulsive velveteen. These two characters are somewhat facilely drawn by Rattigan and his screen collaborator, John Gay, but they are acted for more than they are worth by Niven and Miss Kerr.

Other excellences adorn the film. Wendy Hiller, as the manageress in love with Lancaster, is so womanly and appealing that his preference for Miss Hayworth only estranged him further from me. Gladys Cooper, as Miss Kerr's subtly brutal mother, operates on our nerves with a surgeon's skill. Cathleen Nesbitt, as a well-meaning bystander, creates a lavender air of anachronistic gentility. Felix Aylmer, in the role of a retired, somewhat cowardly schoolmaster, seems in a sense to have stopped acting; he is merely present; but he still speaks as beautiful English as one may now hear.

Delbert Mann, the director, has handled this multi-stranded story like a skilled railway dispatcher, switching us neatly from one tale of troubles to another as we move through the corridors and lounges of the tatty hotel. But the amalgamation of these two plays creates such a thick texture of grief that the implicit motto is Gertrude's line:

> One woe doth tread upon another's heel,
> So fast they follow.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

RECORDS

Outstanding Records of 1958

(Angel: A; Capitol-EMI: CE; Columbia: CO; Epic: E; Haydn Society: H; London: L; Overtone: O; Scala: S; Vanguard: VA; RCA Victor: VI.)

BACH: Arias; Flagstad with London Philharmonic under Boult (L). Brandenburg Concertos; Adolf Busch Chamber Players (A). Partitas Nos. 5 and 6, Fugues: Glenn Gould (C).

BEETHOVEN: Symphony No. 7; Cantelli and Philharmonia (A). Piano Concerto No. 1; Gould and orchestra under Golschmann (C). Violin Concerto; Grumiaux and Amsterdam Concertgebouw under Van Beinum (E). Violin Sonata Op. 96; Grumiaux and Haskil (E). Violin Sonatas (complete); Nelsova and Balsam (L). Diabelli Variations; Shure (E).

BERLIOZ: Instrumental excerpts from *Romeo and Juliet* and *The Damnation of Faust;* Cluytens and Paris Opera Orchestra (A). *Symphonie Fantastique:* Argenta and Paris Conservatory Concerts Orchestra (L).

BOCCHERINI: Quintets; Quintetto Boccherini (A).

BRAHMS: Symphony No. 3; Klemperer and Philharmonia (A). Variations on a Theme of Paganini; Merzhanov (Monitor).

CHERUBINI: *Medea;* Callas and others with La Scala Orchestra under Serafin (Mercury).

CHOPIN: Nocturnes Vol. 2; Katin (L). Cello Sonata Op. 65; Parisot and Mittman (O).

DEBUSSY: *Nuages, Fêtes, Prélude à L'Après-midi d'un Faune;* Cantelli and Philharmonia (A). *Images (Gigues, Ibéria, Rondes de Printemps);* Argenta and Orchestre de la Suisse Romande (L).

DOWLAND: Songs; Oberlin (Experiences Anonymes).

GABRIELI: Processional and Ceremonial Music; Gabrieli Festival Chorus and Orchestra under Appia (VA).

GESUALDO: Madrigals and Sacred Pieces; singers under Craft (C).

HANDEL: Arias; Flagstad with London Philharmonic under Boult (L). Organ Concertos Op. 4; Biggs with London Philharmonic under Boult (C). *Water Music* (complete); Hewitt Orchestra (H).

HAYDN: Quartets Op. 33 and Op. 76 Nos. 1 and 2; Schneider Quartet (H). Quartets Op. 54 Nos. 1 and 2; Amadeus Quartet (A). Symphonies Nos. 94 and 99; Krips and Vienna Philharmonic (strident sound requires 7-kc cut-off) (L). Piano Sonata No. 3; Gould (C).

LE ROUX: Pièces de Clavecin; Fuller (O).

MAHLER: Symphony No. 2; Bruno Walter with New York Philharmonic and soloists (C). *Das Lied von der Erde* and *Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen;* Van Beinum with Amsterdam Concertgebouw and soloists (E). *Lieder eines fahrenden Gesellen;* Fischer-Dieskau and Philharmonia under Furtwaengler (A).

MENDELSSOHN: *Italian* Symphony; Cantelli and Philharmonia (A). *Midsummer Night's Dream* Music; Maag with London Symphony and singers (L).

MONTEVERDI: Vocal Pieces; Ensemble under Boulanger (A).

MORLEY: Madrigals; Deller Consort (VA).

MOZART: Symphonies K. 385 *(Haffner)* and 551 *(Jupiter);* Krips and Vienna Philharmonic (sound requires 7-kc cut-off) (L). Piano Concerto K. 466; Fischer and Philharmonia (A). Piano Concerto K. 491; Gieseking and Philharmonia under Von Karajan (A). String Quintets; Budapest Quartet and Trampler (C). Piano Quartet K. 493; Istomin, Stern, Katims, M. Schneider (C). Piano Sonata K. 330; Gould (C). Requiem; Kempe with Berlin Philharmonic and singers (CE).

PROKOFIEV: Piano Concerto No. 3 and Piano Pieces; Prokofiev and London Symphony under Coppola (A).

PURCELL: Vocal and Instrumental Pieces; Deller and others (VA). *The Fairy Queen;* Elsie Morison, Jennifer Vyvyan and others with Boyd Neel Orchestra under Anthony Lewis (L).

ROSSINI: *The Barber of Seville;* Callas, Gobbi, Alva with Philharmonia under Galliere (A). *Le Comte Ory;* Glyndebourne Festival (A). *La Boutique Fantasque;* Solti and Israel Philharmonic (L).

SCHUBERT: *Unfinished* Symphony; Cantelli and Philharmonia (A). Octet; Berlin Philharmonic Chamber Ensemble (CE). *Trout* Quintet; Vienna Octet and Curzon (L). Trio Op. 99; Cortot-Thibaud-Casals (A). Violin Sonata Op. 137 No. 2; A. Schneider and Horszowski (C). *Arpeggione* Sonata; Parisot (cello) and Mittman (O). Piano Sonata in B flat; Schnabel (A). Songs; Fischer-Dieskau and Moore (A).

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SCHUMANN: Carnaval; Rachmaninov (VI).

STRAVINSKY: Petrushka; Ansermet and Orchestre de la Suisse Romande (L). *Le Sacre du Printemps;* Markevitch and Philharmonia (A).

TCHAIKOVSKY: *The Sleeping Beauty;* Weldon and Philharmonia (A).

VIVALDI: *L'Estro Armonico;* Tomasow and Boskowski with Vienna State Opera Chamber Ensemble under Rossi (VA). *The Four Seasons* from *Il Cimento dell' Armonia e dell' Invenzione;* I Solisti di Zagreb (VA). Concertos Nos. 9 to 12 from *Il Cimento;* I Musici (E).

WAGNER: *Die Meistersinger;* Gruemmer, Schock, Frantz with Berlin Philharmonic under Kempe (A).

WILBYE: Madrigals; Deller Consort (VA).

COLLECTIONS: Chaliapin in excerpts from *Boris Godunov* (A). Della Casa in songs of Schubert, Brahms, Wolf and Strauss (L). Hempel in excerpts from *La Traviata, The Barber of Seville, The Huguenots* etc. (S). Lotte Lehmann in songs of Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, Wolf etc. (VI). Lilli Lehmann in music of Mozart, Beethoven, Verdi etc. (S). Pinza in music of Mozart, Rossini, Verdi etc. (C). Elisabeth Schumann in songs of Wolf and Strauss (A).

B. H. HAGGIN

A Communication

(Continued from page 3)

of the thoughtful character of his general comments on national and world events. He does concede that Senator Johnson's proposed change is little different from the present filibuster rule. And he does not, like some, charge that our proposed rule would endanger full and fair debate. Instead, he bases his opposition on the claim that on a very controversial issue—like equal protection of the laws for our Negro citizens—a majority of the whole Senate should not have the power to act.

Clearly this is a principle of allowing the elected representatives of a section of our country to veto action believed necessary by most of the Nation, including much enlightened opinion in the South. I cannot believe such a surrender to nullification is in the best interests of the country. It places a premium upon resistance to the Constitution and the orders of the Court—and in extreme situations, upon lawlessness. It takes away the hope of orderly, thoroughly-debated legislative assistance for those deprived of their rights. It prevents the Nation from marshalling its resources of reason and law to make a deliberate transition to compliance with the Constitution and the moral principles that undergird it.

And I believe Mr. Lippmann in this case ignores another overriding factor to which he is ordinarily so sensitive, the responsibility of our country in leading the forces of freedom in the world. We gravely damage the whole Nation in its struggle against tyranny if we allow it to default on its promises to its own colored citizens.

But that is what the present filibuster rule in the Senate does, and what the slight modification proposed by Senator Johnson to a simple two-thirds limitation would do. That was the rule from 1917 to 1949. It did not work. No debate limitation on a civil rights bill was passed even once, though it was tried eight times, and secured large majorities (but not two-thirds) twice, in 1950.

Mr. Lippmann correctly points out that the Constitution provides for a two-thirds vote in some cases—treaties, overriding vetoes, expulsion, impeachment and constitutional amendments. But those cases are carefully and specifically provided. They furnish no justification for the Senate by its rules in effect to amend the constitution further so that on civil rights bills or other controversial measures a two-thirds vote in the Senate is required.

Furthermore, beyond the opportunities for prolonged debate which our proposed filibuster-limitation rule still affords, the smaller states and Southern states already have the built-in protection in the Senate of having two Senators for each state, regardless of population. Thus the 24 smallest states with less than 20 percent of our population can block action in the Senate by the 24 largest states with over 80 percent of our population even with the majority rule, which Mr. Lippmann decries.

In addition the operation of the seniority system gives these small states and the Southern staes a heavy perponderance of the powerful congressional committee chairmanships. Surely the foregoing factors confer enough power on the representatives of a minority even under majority rule in the Senate, without giving to 33 Senators the right to block action by 65, as the present rule does.

Mr. Lippmann's example of President Truman's emergency strike legislation hardly strengthens the argument. If six days debate in the Senate stopped the bad features of that bill, as he points out, surely the eight weks permitted under our proposal could do the same.

PAUL H. DOUGLAS

US Senate
Washington, D. C.

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
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